什么叫pure discount bond

1. 什么叫pure discount bond

意思是纯贴现债券，是指承诺在未来某个时点作单笔支付的债券。它有两种形式：（1）没有利息，到期还本；（2）到期一次还本付息。

2. 次信贷危机用英语怎么表达？

Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Debt again
The mortgage crisis has surprising roots that go back decades. Why we need to rethink how we buy our homes.
By Robert Kuttner  |  August 19, 2007

THE SPIKE IN defaults on "subprime mortgages" has exposed underlying weaknesses in an economy built on too much speculative borrowing. It's not clear where all this will end, but for now credit is drying up for blue-chip corporations as well as high-risk mortgage lenders.

With financial tremors spilling over into the wider economy, major retailers like Home Depot and Wal-Mart are reporting softer sales as housing values decline and consumers put off discretionary purchases. Every investor, from retirees to university endowments, is at risk if the inflated stock market turns out to be another bubble. Even if the wider damage is contained, some 2 million mortgages are scheduled for rate increases this fall, and foreclosures are expected to soar.

What went wrong? President Bush recently blamed "easy money" and the failure of borrowers to read the fine print. A BusinessWeek cover story faulted home builders for overbuilding and then hooking up buyers with overly lenient mortgage lenders. The mortgage companies offering subprime loans blame the Wall Street financiers whose investments made the practice possible.

But in truth, the problem runs much deeper. The mortgage business has long been a tug of war between a social commitment to broad homeownership and the schemes of private financial operators looking to make a quick buck. In the wake of the Great Depression, the US government devised a strikingly effective system for bringing homeownership to the masses. Since the late 1970s, however, this system has been dismantled in the name of deregulation, causing a string of disastrous results.

The subprime mess is not so much a new crisis as a continuation of the saga that began with the savings and loan scandal of the early 1980s, when executives of S&Ls went on a risky lending binge with government-insured money. Then, as now, there are many individual culprits, but the real problem is the ideology of deregulation and the capture of public policy for private gain by the financial industry.

Homeownership is at the core of the American dream. Since the era of the American Revolution, owning property has been considered the mark of a solid citizen who is a stakeholder in the community. Mortgages enable ordinary people, who do not have the cash to buy a home outright, to join the propertied class. For most people, even today, their prime financial asset is the equity in their home.

The Republic's founders believed that a self-governing people needed to be a society of freeholders. President Jefferson sponsored a land-tenure system that largely kept the frontier out of the hands of land speculators, and favored yeoman farmers. With the passage in 1862 of the Homestead Act under President Lincoln, ordinary people could get title to 160 acres, free, if they worked the land. By 1900, in several western states, more than 60 percent of people were already homeowners.

In the early 19th century, immigrant, ethnic, and labor groups began creating "building and loan" societies, modeled on British cooperatives that originated in Birmingham in 1774. These mutual aid societies enabled people of modest means to pool savings and borrow money to build or buy homes. While these societies offered more flexible terms than banks, the typical mortgage was relatively short-term -- three to five years was common -- with much of the principal still owed at the end.

During the Great Depression, the wave of foreclosures inspired the Roosevelt government to invent the long-term, self-amortizing home loan. This innovation allowed the borrower to make fixed payments that pay off both interest and debt.

This new kind of mortgage was part of a larger strategy to spread homeownership, and protect the system from catastrophic failures. Congress first acted to insure mortgages, then established the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) to buy qualified mortgages, replenishing lenders' funds to make more home loans. A system of Federal Home Loan Banks was established to supervise and loan money to local mortgage lenders. The government also created federal deposit insurance (the familiar "FDIC") to protect savers from bank failures, and restore confidence in the banking system.

Here was a stunningly successful system of social invention. The national rate of homeownership dramatically increased in the prosperous postwar decades, from about 44 percent on the eve of World War II to 64 percent by the mid-1960s. There were no notable scandals, few losses by lenders, and the government-sponsored systems of deposit insurance regularly turned a profit.

But any industry this big was bound to be irresistible to speculators. In several waves of deregulation, the industry managed to slip the bonds of government banking supervision. In each of these cycles, free-marketeers promised greater efficiency and more plentiful credit, if government regulators would just get out of the way. In each episode, however, the result has been increased speculation followed by huge losses and costs to the public, hurting the very people the mortgage system is supposed to help.

. . .

The first casualty was the savings and loan collapse. S&Ls, heirs to 19th-century building societies, had traditionally been staid and prudent institutions, mostly nonprofits with a social mission. As long as they maintained standards, few lost money. A well-worn industry joke called it the "3-6-3" system: take in deposits at 3 percent, lend out mortgages at 6 percent, and be on the golf course by 3 p.m.

But thanks to a lobbying blitz early in the anti-government Reagan era, Congress liberated S&Ls to speculate in far-flung ventures with no connection to their core mission of providing mortgages. Tiny S&Ls were allowed to become multibillion-dollar behemoths almost overnight, by offering premium interest rates on savings deposits. They then had to find riskier uses of the money to cover their higher costs. A lot of these loans went bad. Loan defaults and S&L bankruptcies ultimately cost taxpayers more than $200 billion.

In the subprime lending crisis that repeated the pattern two decades later, yet another form of deregulation was implicated -- the invention of "securitization" by investment bankers. That part of the story begins with the privatization of Roosevelt's FNMA.

In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson's housing aides decided to get FNMA off the government's books, in hopes that a private corporation could provide more liquidity for mortgages. Privatization of FNMA, rebranded as Fannie Mae, set the stage for other private players to get into the business of repackaging mortgages, which was no longer the province of a government agency chartered to act in the public interest.

In 1977, the investment-banking firm Salomon Brothers devised a highly lucrative financial daisy chain. Mortgages could be purchased from the originator of the loan, repackaged as bonds, sorted according to supposed risk, and certified by bond-rating agencies, thus allowing any number of investors to buy the bonds.

Securitization enabled subprime lenders to throw away the rulebook. As long as some investment bank could be found to buy the loan, convert it to a bond, and peddle it to someone else, the mortgage companies could still turn a profit.

In theory, this system makes mortgage credit more plentiful by funneling money from capital markets back to mortgage lenders and to borrowers, just as FNMA did beginning in the 1930s. But in today's privatized version, so many middlemen take cuts that home buyers are no better off.

The union of securitized mortgage credit and subprime lending was a marriage made in hell, waiting to be consummated. Once Congress sorted out the S&L mess, reregulating S&Ls in a 1989 law, more and more mortgage companies began doing end-runs around the regulations.

Most of today's biggest mortgage companies are actually subsidiaries of banks, such as Wells Fargo. While the loan portfolios of the parent banks are still strictly regulated, their mortgage subsidiaries are not, because the loans don't stay on their books. Other such companies are independent, but financed by big banks.

Many of these new-wave mortgage lenders, which make their profits based on their volume of loans, loosened credit standards far beyond the point of prudence, knowing that they could pass off the risk to some other investor. Between 2001 and 2005, the value of subprime loans soared from $50 billion to more than $600 billion, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Borrowers with poor credit histories were offered loans without a full credit check, often without income verification. Mortgage companies offered loans with no down payments and low "teaser" rates that became unaffordable once they rose to the market rate. About 15 percent of these loans, valued at about $67 billion, are already in default.

There was no government agency to temper these practices, since mortgage companies are exempt from federal regulation. Home buyers and lenders were both betting that appreciation in housing prices would allow early refinancings, or that equity windfalls would allow the borrowers to meet the payments. But when the housing market turned soft, they were blindsided. As super-investor Warren Buffett inimitably put it, "You don't know who's swimming naked until the tide goes out."

. . .

Thus the decline and fall of a once-sublime system of providing reliable mortgage credit for the American Dream. The industry has put a pretty face on its tactics, contending that it was virtuously helping less-affluent people become homeowners. But predatory lenders are a feeble substitute for a national homeownership policy.

Since the Reagan presidency, the federal government has largely gotten out of the business of subsidizing first-time homeownership. In the New Deal and postwar eras, moderate-income people got cheap, government-insured loans. Some veterans got direct loans reflecting the government's own low borrowing rate. In the 1960s, the Great Society directly subsidized mortages with rates as low as 1 percent. But this has all been drastically scaled back. Since 1980, the rate of homeownership among Americans age 25 to 34 has dropped from 53 to 45 percent.

The government should resume directly subsidizing starter mortgages and construction of homes for moderate-income buyers. These programs need to combine careful credit assessment with counseling, rather than relying on the tender mercies of the sleaziest wing of the private mortgage industry. It does no favor to aspiring home buyers when dreams end in foreclosure.

As for deregulation of mortgage lending, it's too late to head off this debacle, but Congress should act now to prevent the next one. Banks and S&Ls are regulated because taxpayer money is at risk through deposit insurance. Though mortgage companies do not take deposits, they too need to be regulated because their antics put the entire economy at risk. Irresponsibly speculative lenders should be prohibited from selling mortgages in the secondary market, even if they can find a consenting adult foolish enough to buy them.

My former boss, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, sponsored the 1968 Truth in Lending Act, to require that interest rates be disclosed to borrowers in clear, consistent terms. The senator, who died in 2005, must be whirling in his grave. Today's mortgages are often convoluted and opaque, explicitly designed to mislead the borrower. We need a new Proxmire Act, to limit the bait-and-switch character of mortgages, and to police the secondary market in mortgage securities.

We've now had an experiment in the claims made for mortgage deregulation, extending over three decades, and deregulation flunked. America needs to restore a system in which government supports home- ownership -- and makes sure that mortgage lenders serve as responsible creditors, not predators.

Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, a New York-based think tank. From 1975 through 1977 he was chief investigator for the Senate Banking Committee.

3. 帮忙翻译一下，不要线上自动翻译的啊

金融危机的2007-2008年，最初中提到的媒体作为“信贷紧缩”或“信用危机” ，开始于2007年7月时失去信心的投资者的价值抵押贷款证券化在美国造成了流动性危机，促使大量注入资本进入金融市场的美国联邦储备委员会和欧洲中央银行。贸易，环境和蔓延，一个指标知觉信贷风险的整体经济，升至2007年7月，仍然动荡了一年，然后加甚至更高于2008年9月，达到创纪录的4.65 ％ 10月10日2008年。今年9月到2008年，危机的加深，作为股票市场全世界范围内坠毁，并进入了一个时期的高波动性，并有相当数量的银行，抵押贷款和保险业的公司的失败在以下几个星期。

在GDP中的份额，美国金融部门1860.Although以来美国的住房倒塌通常被认为是造成了危机，金融体系是脆弱的，因为错综复杂的和过度的杠杆金融合同和行动，美国的货币政策使信贷成本微不足道因此，鼓励这种过度利用，一般一个“肥大的金融部门” （金融化）。

一个例子是信用衍生产品-信用违约互换（的C DS） ，其中保险债务持有人对违约行为。他们是传统的私下交易柜台范围以外的监管机构。美国政府的扣押联邦住房贷款抵押公司的拍卖提示其债务，使交易商谁购买和出售的默认保护（的CDS ）可以解决的合同。拍卖是用来设定价格，其中投资者可以解决合同现金，而不是实际交付保证金的反方。卖家的保护支付票面价值的合同减去回收值设置的债券。

4. 2016CFA考纲有变化吗

财-萃回答，2016年CFA考纲是有变化的，
CFA一级考纲对比
　　1. 一级主要变动部分为财务报表、投资组合管理和固定收益部分，具体如下：
　　1.1. 财务报表分析部分
　　1.1.1. SS9 R29. INVENTORIES原考纲的考点c&d合并为16年新考纲的c
　　1.1.2. SS7 R23. FINANCIAL REPORTINGMECHANICS新增考点a describe how business activities are classified for financialreporting purposes;
　　1.1.3. SS9 R31. INCOME TAX 修改内容：知识点h将compare a company’s deferred tax items改成了explain recognition and measurement of current and deferredtax items;
　　1.2.投资组合管理部分
　　1.2.1. SS12 新增整个章节R 42. RISK MANAGEMENT: ANINTRODUCTION
　　1.2.2. SS15 R 55. INTRODUCTION TO ASSET-BACKEDSECURITIES 新增考点e including mortgage pass-through securities andcollateralized mortgage obligations
　　1.3. 固定收益部分
　　1.3.1. SS16 R57 FUNDAMENTALS OF CREDITANALYSIS新增考点b describe defaultprobability and loss severity as components of creditrisk
　　1.3.2. SS15 R55原考点e explain the motivation for creating securitized structures withmultiple tranches(e.g., collateralized mortgage obligations), andthe characteristics and risks of securitizedstructures.整个删除
　　1.4. 其他类投资部分
　　1.4.1. SS18 R 61 INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVEINVESTMENTS考点d &f都添加了describe infrastructure
　　CFA二级考纲对比
　　2. 二级最大的变动部分为投资组合管理，具体如下：
　　2.1. 投资组合管理部分，新考纲中增加3个章节删除3个章节，改动之后Portfolio Management一共有4个章节，新增分别为Reading 53 An Introduction toMultifactor Models，Reading 54 Analysis of ActivePortfolio Management 和Reading 55 Economics and InvestmentMarkets，对应得，删除了原考纲中的Reading 53 PortfolioConcepts，Reading 54 Residual Risk and Return:The Information Ratio和Reading 55 The Fundamental Law ofActive Management。
　　2.2. 数量部分增加1个章节Reading 12 Excerpt from“Probabilistic Approaches: Scenario Analysis, Decision Trees, andSimulations”现有4个章节
　　2.3. 固定收益部分
　　2.3.1. 增加一个考点，考点出现在Reading 43 The Term Structure and InterestRate Dynamics，考点为describe how zero-coupon rates (spotrates) may be obtained from the par curve bybootstrapping。
　　2.3.2. 删除一个考点，考点出现在Reading 45 Valuation and Analysis: Bondswith Embedded Options，考点为calculate the value of a capped orfloored floating-rate bond。
　　CFA三级考纲对比
　　3. 三级内容改动不是很大，但是部分章节进行了微调和合并，具体改变如下：
　　3.1. Ethics 部分
　　3.1.1. SS 2 R4新增内容a. explain the purpose of the AssetManager Code and the benefits that may accrue to a firm that adoptsthe Code
　　3.1.2. SS2 R3 Application of the Code andStandards Ethics case合并了2015年的Reading 3 The Consultant EthicsCases和Reading 4 Pearl InvestmentManagement(A),(B),and(C) Ethics Cases
　　3.2. Asset Allocation and Related Decisions inPortfolio Management部分
　　3.2.1. SS 9 R18. 原考纲为formulate an appropriate currency managementprogramgiven market facts and client’s objectivesand constraints;现改为formulate an appropriate currency managementprogram given financial market conditions and portfolio objectivesand constraints
　　3.3. Trading, Monitoring, andRebalancing部分
　　3.3.1. SS 16 R30. Monitoring andRebalancing删除内容i. distinguish among linear, concave,and convex rebalancing strategies.
　　3.3.2. SS 16 R30. Monitoring andRebalancing删除内容j. judge the appropriateness of constant mix,buy-and-hold, and CPPI rebalancing strategies when given aninvestor’s risk tolerance and asset returnexpectations

5. 急求翻译！英译中！！！！

在Subprime借贷危机的二个看法 
在抵押混乱的Two视图出现于昨天华尔街日报(实际上有一些更多，本文比任何人需要知道，特别是关于财政新的世纪(新))真正地现在似乎几乎墙到墙的与在subprime借贷-更多的新闻。 当代抵押出租The第一视图进来这个报告($)关于在从出借者处购买的债务的生长困厄。 它绘什么的一幅黑暗的画可以向前在来的星期和月在。 
For年，华尔街投资工具阴暗的类行动了象在的一个机车住房提供经费给事务，导致成长通过吸收危险的抵押债券和分配他们到投资者环球。 
Now，当抵押问题登上，并且一系列抵押结合降低等级织布机，这些投资，叫作抵押债务，开始看起来一辆不同的车 -- 火箭超载与可燃烧的燃料。 
Some大投资银行摇摆由于问题，当发射的新的CDO在subprime抵押市场上，成交，迎合最少可给予信贷的借户。 他们买，使他们更难卖并且压低他们的价格的问题也有投资者要求在CDOs的高回报。 
CDOs是华尔街的抵押把切成小方块和切的机器的整体部分。 在抵押被写之后，他们生产支付抵押保证的债券，投资银行认购的投资银行一起合并他们并且使用现金流动。 
The抵押债券，反之，在切片再经常被包装入CDOs并且廉价出售。 投资者能选择买债券的危险的片断或购买切片有较少风险。 
直到现在，信用评级代办处是慢的起反应，提示问题是否将有一广泛拉紧信用。


刚才回答过你的另一个,如果还翻译的话进下面这个网吧

6. 求一篇英文财务论文 最好中英都有的那种

Finance

Finance is the science of funds management.[1] The general areas of finance are business finance, personal finance, and public finance.[2] Finance includes saving money and often includes lending money. The field of finance deals with the concepts of time, money and risk and how they are interrelated. It also deals with how money is spent and budgeted.
Finance works most basically through individuals and business organizations depositing money in a bank. The bank then lends the money out to other individuals or corporations for consumption or investment, and charges interest on the loans.
Loans have become increasingly packaged for resale, meaning that an investor buys the loan (debt) from a bank or directly from a corporation. Bonds are debt instruments sold to investors for organisations such as companies, governments or charities [3]. The investor can then hold the debt and collect the interest or sell the debt on a secondary market. Banks are the main facilitators of funding through the provision of credit, although private equity, mutual funds, hedge funds, and other organizations have become important as they invest in various forms of debt. Financial assets, known as investments, are financially managed with careful attention to financial risk management to control financial risk. Financial instruments allow many forms of securitized assets to be traded on securities exchanges such as stock exchanges, including debt such as bonds as well as equity in publicly-traded corporations.
Central banks, such as the Federal Reserve System banks in the United States and Bank of England in the United Kingdom, are strong players in public finance, acting as lenders of last resort as well as strong influences on monetary and credit conditions in the economy

The main techniques and sectors of the financial industry